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In Network Security, there is a major issue to secure the public or private network from ab-
normal users. It is because each network is made up of users, services and computers with a 
specific behavior that is also called as heterogeneous system. To detect abnormal users, ano-
maly detection system (ADS) is used. In this paper, we present a novel and hybrid Anomaly 
Detection System with the uses of IP gray space analysis and dominant scanning port identifi-
cation heuristics used to detect various anomalous users with their potential behaviors. This 
methodology is the combination of both statistical and rule based anomaly detection which 
detects five types of anomalies with their three types of potential behaviors and generates re-
spective alarm messages to GUI. 
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Introduction 
As network is having a very big and hetero-
geneous environment, many large and important 
applications are running at side by side on the 
network. To handle all these issues, the network 
security must consider the behavior of   the out-
side users from the internet which may cause the 
harm to the network and becomes anomalous us-
ers. The challenge of detection of anomalous host 
is accepted by anomaly detection system.  
We  present  three  steps  Methodology  which is 
used to detect external anomalous host with their 
scanning behaviors using IP gray space analysis 
and scanning foreign port used by them. IP gray 
space is a collection of unassigned IP addresses 
in a campus network which are not assigned to 
any active host [1].  
 
1.1 Background and Motivations  
Intrusion Detection technique is classified in two 
categories: signature based misuse detection and 
anomaly detection [2] [3]. In signature based mi-
suse detection technique, approaches are strictly 
limited to the known abnormal users only. How 
to detect newly identified abnormal users is one 
of biggest challenge faced by signature or misuse 
detection [4]. To overcome this limitation of sig-
nature based misuse detection, the  concept of 
anomaly detection was introduced in the work of 
Denning [5]. According to Denning security, vi-
olations could be detected by inspecting abnor-
mal system usage patterns from the audit data.  
In reality, most Anomaly Detection Techniques 
attempts to set up normal activity profiles by 
computing various metrics and an intrusion is de-
tected when the actual system behavior deviates 
from the normal profiles [6]. The main advantage 
of anomaly detection is that, it does not require 
prior knowledge of intrusion and can thus detect 
new intrusions. But detecting any attack regard-
less of whether they are known or unknown with 
their potential behavior is  the major challenge, 
which is not experienced in early IDS and ADS 
research. The proposed system overcomes these 
problems in signature based misuse detection and 
conventional anomaly detection system. We have 
designed  and implemented  a  novel  network 
Anomaly  Detection  System  (ADS),  which uses 
both IP gray space analysis and dominant scan-
ning  port identification heuristics (DSPI).  The 
proposed ADS system detects three categories of 
anomaly  with their potential behaviors for the 
campus network. In this paper, we apply the nov-
el notion of IP gray space analysis [1]. 
 
1.2 Introduction to Network Anomaly Detec-
tion  
Anomaly is a behavior based system which de-
tects normal and abnormal users in system. An 
anomaly detection system establishes baseline for 
all users and depends on it decides anomaly [10]. 
Network anomaly is an abstraction of existing in-
trusion detection techniques to the network level 
allowing us to simultaneously monitor the securi-
ty of multiple nodes as well as the network infra-
structure.  Network anomalies typically refer to 
circumstances when network operations deviate 
from normal network behavior. The anomalies 
can arise due to various causes such as malfunc-
tioning network devices, bad configuration in 
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network services and operating systems, network 
overload, malicious denial of service attacks, ill 
advised applications installed by users, high lev-
el users’ effort to discover network and gather 
information about it and its devices. These ano-
malous events will disrupt the normal behavior 
of some network data [6] [7]. 
Anomaly detections systems can detect previous-
ly unknown attacks [10]. By defining what’s 
normal, they make it possible to identify any var-
iations, no matter whether it is part of the threat 
model or not 
• Faults can be detected indirectly by using pat-
tern matching by considering the behavior of 
fault this can happened in anomaly detection sys-
tem 
• The goal of Anomalies detection is too able to 
detect a wide range of abnormal behavior as Ill 
as malicious intrusions including those for which 
no previous detection signature exist 
• Anomalies detection is statistical in nature and 
work on the concept of measuring the number of 
events happening in given time interval for a mo-
nitored metric. A simple example of logging in 
which the incorrect password too many times, 
causing as account to be locked out and generat-
ing a Message to the security log. NAD system 
can monitored unusual user account activity, ex-
cessive file and object access, high CPU utiliza-
tion  inappropriate protocol used, unusual login 
frequency, high number of concurrent login, high 
number of sessions, any code manipulations, un-
usual content . All these features of ADS is used 
in authentication. 
Anomaly detection system is statistical based or 
rule based. Statistical based anomaly detection 
system gathers network traffic and generates sta-
tistics and according to that statistics it detects 
anomaly. Rule based anomaly detection system is 
having association or heuristic rules with it and 
according to these rules it detects anomaly. The 
methodology that we are going to develop is the 
combination of both statistical and rule based 
anomaly. 
 
2 Introduction to IP gray space and IP active 
space analysis 
Campus or enterprise networks often have many 
unassigned  IP addresses that collectively form IP 
gray space within the   address blocks of such 
networks [1][8]. The IP space is divided into two 
address blocks: IP gray space and IP active space. 
All IP addresses are not likely to be assigned to 
“active” hosts (i.e., actual machines such as serv-
ers, desktops, lap tops, etc.) at any given time pe-
riod. We refer to these IP addresses within the 
campus network that are not assigned to any host 
throughout a given time period, say, an hour or a 
day, as “inactive” or gray IP addresses. In con-
trast, the IP addresses  within the same address 
blocks that are assigned to hosts at any point 
within the time period are referred to as active IP 
addresses. 
The inactive IP addresses collectively forms IP 
gray space [1] within the address blocks, while 
active addresses the active space. By definition, 
IP gray and active space within a campus or any 
network are time dependent in other words, they 
are not fixed and vary over time. Unlike the all 
studied IP “dark space" analysis techniques   
which are inherently ex situ and can potentially 
be evaded, IP gray space analysis is in situ and 
provides us with a direct means to monitor, iden-
tify and track anomalous, suspicious and poten-
Fig. 2. Distributions of Gray IP and Active IP 
Addresses 
 
Fig. 1. Typical Anomaly Detection  
Advantages of Anomaly Detection System over 
Misuse Detection system 




tially harmful activities launched by the anomal-
ous hosts. In particular, I observe the traffic gen-
erated by outside hosts towards both the IP gray 
space and active space of a network, and corre-
late them to infer the nature of activities engaged 
by the outside hosts and isolate potentially harm-
ful ones, which is an anomalous user. After all, it 
is live hosts (behind active IP addresses) that out-
side attackers are interested. I will use a simple 
heuristic algorithm for extracting the IP gray 
space within a campus/enterprise network, and 
applied IP gray space analysis for dissecting and 
classifying various scanning activities of outside 
and inside hosts. 
 
2.1 IP Gray Space Identification  
Let I denote the collection of all IP addresses of a 
network under consideration, and t0 the starting 
time of a time period of interest, and T the length 
of the period. We say an (inside) IP address  g∈I 
is a gray (or inactive) address over the time pe-
riod [t0, t0+T] if and only if no traffic originating 
from g  is observed during [t0-Ť, t0 +T + Ť ] for 
some fixed Ť. G denotes the collection of all gray 
IP addresses within the time period, or IP gray 
space. The Complementary set,    A = I-G, is re-
ferred to the active space. In other words, for any 
a ∈ A, there is traffic originating from a at some 
time during [t0-Ť, t0 +T + Ť] thus a is likely as-
signed to an active host during the time period. In 
this study, we set to be 24 hours, t0 the zero hour 
of a day, and Ť one hour. 
 
 
2.2 IP Gray Space Characteristics  
We  apply the proposed  heuristic to the PRTG 
Network Traffic Grapher at the router of  our 
ADS client server network  in our campus net-
work. 
Since no traffic is observed to originate from a 
gray IP address to any outside host (in the rest of 
the Internet) for an entire day, it is likely that the 
address is not assigned to any live host during 
that day. Ideally one would expect no traffic from 
any outside host either. This is in general not true 
at all because external anomalous host doesn’t 
know the IP space. 
 
2.3 Anomaly Detection using IP gray space 
analysis  
This work involves the development of three step 
methodology. 
Step1: Identification of anomalous external host 
using IP gray space and relative uncertainty. 
In the first step, we  set an IP active threshold 
range that range is called as IP active space. Such 
a threshold setting is called as association rule 
generation [11] for supervised learning. If source 
IP address of communication host is comes from  
IP Active Space then the respective communicat-
ing host is a normal user. In contrast, if commu-
nicating host uses gray then that will be anomal-
ous host. To implement this step, we set up thre-
sholds for IP Active Space  (192.168.55.1 to 
192.168.55.254) if any host crosses that threshold 
of IP active space then it will be anomalous host. 
Fig. 4. Traffic Scanning for IP Gray Space Analysis at our campus network 
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Here  we are calculating relative uncertainty 
(RU). Relative Uncertainty is standardized entro-
py which detects observational variety of any 
anomalous host. 
 
Let Oѕ be the set of outside hosts that we have to 
characterize for checking anomaly. For any h∈ 
Oѕ, let GF (h) denote the collection of gray flows 
generated by h. The destination ports (dstPrt in 
short) used by gray flows in GF (h) induce an 
empirical distribution,  for each dstPrt i, pi: = 
mi/m where mi is the number of gray flows in GF 
(h) with dstPrt i, and m is the total number of 
gray flows in GF (h), m = | GF (h)|. Entropy is 
the measurement of the observational variety in 
the observed values of any variable X [9]. It is 
denoted by H(X)  which is Entropy (empirical) of 
X. Uncertainty is a empirical probability p (xi) of 
any variable x on a given time variably, which is 
denoted as p (xi) = mi/m, xi∈X 
The (empirical) entropy of X is then defined as 
H(X) = - ∑
∈X xi
xi p xi p ) ( log ) (  ………. (1) 
Standardized entropy below referred to as rela-
tive uncertainty (RU) which provides an index of 
variety or uniformity regardless of the support or 
sample size: 




X H  …………….... (2) 
We apply information theoretical metric Relative 
Uncertainty (RU) or standardized entropy defined 
below to the destination port distribution of h to 
identify dominant scanning (destination) ports (if 
they exist). So from equations (1) and (2) we get 
RU for destination as well as server port  










Step2: Identification of category of Anomaly us-
ing dominant scanning port (DSPI). 
In this step, we identify five categories of anoma-
lies using their dominant scanning port (DSP). 
DSP is the foreign port and port service used by 
scanning flaws SF (h) of anomalous host for 
communication with internal host. From equation 
(3) we can define RU (SrcPrt), for source port 
(srcPrt) distribution of GF (h). Hence RU (srcPrt) 
and RU (dstPrt) allows us to determine the exis-
tence of dominant scanning port in the gray flaws 
of an outside host[1]. 
 
DSPI Heuristic algorithm 
Statement:- 
Parameters GF (h), β=βo; 
Initialization: DSP: =Ǿ; 
Compute pro. dist. Pprt and Ө:= RU(prt) from 
GF(h); 
While Ө≤ β and |GF (h)| >= 10 do 
            Find prti with highest Pprti 
           DSP: =DSP∪ prti 
          Remove flaws associated with prti from 
GF (h) 
           Remove Pprti from Pprt; 
           Compute Ө: = RU (prt) from GF (h) 
End While 
 
Working of DSPI Heuristic Algorithm  
This Algorithm presents a heuristic procedure for 
extracting DSP from either the destination or 
source   port distribution dstprt of host h∈OS 
(the same procedure applies to both dstPrt and 
srcPrt). The algorithm starts with an empty DSP 
Fig. 5. Traffic generated by Gray IP at our campus network  




(DSP =: =Ǿ) set. It iteratively finds the port with 
the current highest probability, adds the flows as-
sociated with it from GF (h). The algorithm ter-
minates when there are not enough flows left (GF 
(h) < 10) or the ports in the rest of the flows are 
nearly  uniformly  distributed  (RU  (prt)  >  βo, 
where we choose βo = 0.7). In this algorithm βo 
is a gray constant. 
 
Types of anomalies detected using DSPI algo-
rithm 
(i) Bad Scanner-I: 
This group includes Bad Scanners that employ 
ICMP probes in their dominant scanning activi-
ties, and upon receiving responses to the ICMP 
probes from live hosts (From the active space), 
they follow up with TCP/UDP scanning activities 
. The Bad Scanners belong to this sub-group, are 
searching for well-known port service like SSH 
Remote Login Protocol,  SMTP, WWW  HTTP 
and ports 22, 25, 80. These bad scanners receive 
few successful responses from live inside hosts. 
(ii) Bad Scanner-II: 
A Bad Scanner in this sub-group scans using 
TCP/UDP probes on a variety of ports, many of 
which are exploit or service ports furthermore, 
after responding to the TCP/UDP probes, a few 
live inside hosts in return initiate an ICMP ping 
or a TCP connection request on port 113 (the 
IDENT protocol) to which the scanners respond 
back. Furthermore, these active inside hosts are 
being scanned on a variety of ports including ser-
vice, exploit, and high TCP/UDP ports, to which 
they all respond successfully via reverse DNS 
lookup and they are names for DHCP assigned 
machines.  Outside hosts that scan for port 25, a 
query of their IP addresses in the well  known 
spammers. 
(iii) Bad Scanner-III: 
The  bad scanners that also scan using the 
TCP/UDP probes and receive responses from 
some live inside hosts furthermore they also have 
other TCP/UDP connections with these live in-
side hosts that are initiated by them. Correlating 
the scanning activities with other activities, we 
find that most of the other connections initiated 
by these bad scanners occur after the scanning 
activities (SF flows) (cursor  activities). In the 
midst of these suspicious activities, he/she also 
launches a TCP port 80 scanning which also 
touches the inside host, they are performing que-
ries to an inside DNS server, and then launch 
scanning for TCP port80. The remaining bad 
scanners in this sub-group are engaged in some 
kind of follow-up activities. Some bad scanners 
of this   category make sequential scanning on 
TCP port 445 for Microsoft DS, UDP port 1023 
and TCP port 5554 for SGI ESP HTTP. 
(iv) Focused Hitters: 
The DSP of focused hitters typically belong to a 
small number of applications, especially, SMTP, 
Web and peer-to-peer. For example these target 
the destination port 25, namely, attempting to 
access email servers, some targets the web ser-
vice ports, 80 and 443, and some targets the des-
tination ports such as 6881 (Bit Torrent) and 
6364 (Gnutella) that are typically associated with 
peer-to- peer applications, some targets X win-
dows service port 6000, while some focused hit-
ters targets various high ports. We first perform 
Fig. 6. H-NADS Model Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 2/2009 
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an in depth analysis of the biggest sub group, 
Major focused hitters that attempt to access email 
servers. Focus Hitters probes the port 25 having 
the service of SMTP. 
(v) Mixed Intruders Anomaly: 
This is the new category of anomaly that we are 
detecting.  Mixed Intruder anomaly detection is 
one of the biggest challenge in anomaly detection 
because mixed intruders is do not have fixed be-
havior they may vary their behavior continuously 
by changing their scanning flaws and other flaws. 
Mixed Intruder anomaly is having hybrid beha-
vior of normal and abnormal activities. Some ex-
ternal outside host who are disturbing normal 
baseline of network also do the normal scanning 
activities such users are called as mixed intruder 
anomaly because they are having mixed attitude. 
To detect such anomaly we first check for bad 
scanner and focus hitters if any one of them is al-
so doing normal activities which consist to access 
dynamic ports and their services. once we detect 
such host who is involve in hybrid activities such 
hosts are comes in this category of mixed intrud-
ers and with that we alert the GUI . 
Step3:  Determination of Potential Behavior of 
each anomaly using scanning flaws ratio. 
In the third step of the proposed methodology, we 
detect potential behavior of each anomaly using 
scanning flaws and other flaws. In this step, we 
calculates  scanning flaws ratio  γ  which  takes 
scanning flaws generated by anomalous host h 
such that h∈OS , where OS is the set of all ano-
malous hosts. Such scanning flaws are denoted 
by SF(h). Such anomalous host also generates 
some other flaws is denoted by OF (h), and again 
requires DSPI heuristics. The DSPI algorithm has 
been used  to  extract dominant destination and 
source ports for all outside hosts in Os.  Using 
those identified DSP, we then separate incoming 
flows into two categories scanning flows SF (h) 
and other flows OF (h).  Scanning flows are the 
flows associated with corresponding source or 
destination DSP, while the remaining flows are 
considered as other flows. There are many rea-
sons that a gray outside host produces other 
flows. In many cases, these other flows can be 
part of normal activities of the host, e.g. an out-
side host that inter acts with some inside hosts 
normally could be infected by worms that gener-
ate the scanning flows. In this step, we define the 
scanning flow ratio γ of h as γ = |SF (h)|/ (|SF (h)| 
+ |OF (h)|) which indicates how dominant the 
scanning flows are in the outside host’s interac-
tion with the network 
γ = 
) h ( OF ) h ( SF
) h ( SF
+ ………… (4) 
IF γ = 1 then DSP flows having only work to dis-
turb the network not other than this. We calculate 
γ for every anomalous host from equation (4) and 
decide level of potential behavior of that particu-
lar anomalous host. The main purpose behind the 
detection of behavior is according to behavior 
network access control will make various provi-
sions for defending the network.  
 
Table 1. Criteria to Decide Behaviors 
Value of γ  Behavior 
γ = 1  Highly Potential (Harmful) 
γ >=0.5  Potential  
γ <0.5   Average  
 
2.4 Implementation of proposed Methodology 
We  develop  an  H-NADS Model (Hybrid Net-
work Anomaly Detection Model), which detects 
anomalies with their potential behaviors. The im-
plementation of methodology has been performed 
in three steps: 
 
Working of H-NADS-Model  
H-NADS model first scan the network traffic for 
Source IP, port, message, after scanning or ana-
lyzing model performs anomaly detection accord-
ing to IP Gray Space Analysis for Gray IP Ad-
dress and destination scanning ports(DSP)(DSPI 
Heuristic algorithm). If particular condition 
matches anomaly detection module generates an 
alarm or message signal and provides guideline 
to access control system for access control for a 
given user or traffic behavior. 
Steps to detect anomalies by using H-NADS 
Model  
First, transaction data of networks are sampled to 
highlight potential network service anomalies on 
a per service class basis. Secondly, temporal 
based performance thresholds for service classes 
are built from historical network data for base 
lining performance Characteristics. Thirdly, 
anomaly detection proper is executed by compar-
ing the sampled real-time data and the baselines. 





More specifically the three steps of network 
anomaly detection are 
• Sampling or analyzing network traffic :This 
model self-consistently and preferentially sam-
ples the network (e.g., transaction records gener-
ated by network switches) to detect transactions 
that have high probabilities for being anomalous, 
according to a sampling strategy that depends on 
the historical performance of the service class in 
question. The sampling scheme strikes a balance 





• IP Gray Space generation using Association 
rules (DSPI Heuristic algorithm): by generat-
ing some sample association rules according to 
Gray or Active IP and Dominant Scanning Ports 
(DSP) for static and dynamic user or network de-
vice behavior and maintained it as a static or dy-
namic network traffic knowledge. 
• Anomaly detection: In this step every ADS 
client is check by calculating its RU (srcIP) and 
RU (dstIP). According to RU Here I will classify 
type of anomalous outside host this is a Bad 
Scanner, focused hitter or mixed intruder anoma-
lies outside host. Here all the anomalous scanners 
are classified into five categories three of Bad 
Scanners anomalous users, focus hitter anomal-
ous user and third is mixed intruder. According to 
anomalous user separate alert message will 
supply to the GUI. The outputs of the detector are 
typically sent to a graphic user interface (GUI) to 
alert network operators of network anomalies and 
faults, or are sent directly to network access con-
trol modules for automatic feedback and control 
(e.g., circuit breaker, rerouting module, etc.). 
Table 2. Comparison of Gray Anatomy and H-NADS Methodology  
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2.5 Knowledgebase Used by H-NADS Model  
Our methodology requires two types of knowled-
gebase one is static knowledge and other is dy-
namic knowledge Static knowledge allows identi-
fying those network traffic parameters that are 
expected to be verified in each network as they 
have been defined in standard documents. dy-
namic traffic knowledge, based on the idea that it 
is possible to identify a small set of traffic para-
meters, useful for detecting network anomalies, 
analyzing traffic statistics. 
 
Some parameters are simple counters or gauges 
that have been selected according to the lessons 
learnt during the study of static network know-
ledge, whereas more complex parameters are de-
rived from the composition of simple parameters 
using simple operators such as ratio or derivative. 
What leads the authors to label this knowledge 
`dynamic' are not the traffic parameters, but the 
thresholds associated with each parameter, that 
are not the same for every host 
 
2.6 Contributions and work extended by our 
methodology: 
We are removing some loopholes from existing 
ADS using IP gray space analysis methodology 
(gray anatomy) 
2.7. Results and Discussion  
After the development of H-NADS Model, we 
conduct system testing by providing sample set 
of traffic patterns.  In this system testing we 
measures empirical performance of our H-NADS 
Model for detection of anomaly and their poten-
tial behaviors. Then we represent some sample 
empirical results in the form of screenshots, table 
and graph and shown our contribution in the ex-
isting work. 
With the detection of anomalies our methodology 
also shows the details of all external host in this 
detail external host details shows the source IP 
address of external host which avoids the spoof 
IP Address problem . Some external host try to 
make the land attacks such problems are also 
Fig. 9. Report Generation after detection of various Anomalies 
Fig. 8. GUI for the Detection of Bad Scanner II Anomaly with its Behavior 




avoided.  The  external host details shows the 
source and destination ports these ports are re-
quired in DSPI heuristic algorithm. The external 
host details also show the message or any com-
munication made for external host.
 
If the communicating hosts consist of anomalies 
absolutely it will detect by our methodology. 
Once methodology detect anomaly the methodol-
ogy automatically generates reports regarding the 
anomaly detection as shown above. 
Analysis of All Detected Anomalies: 
In our discussion we are detecting number of 
anomalies  with their potential behaviors. After 
detection we are clustering them by using any 
clustering algorithm. Such clustering or grouping 
is used for identifying the common group beha-
vior of various anomalies. If we identify the 
group behavior we are able to defend the network 
using common access denying provision. So for 
that defending purpose we are graphically ana-
lyzing the detected all anomalies.  
 
3 Conclusion and Future Work  
Anomaly detection is a major issue in network 
security, so by considering this myth we develop 
and implement a three step approach for identify-
ing and tracking anomalous host by considering 
IP Gray Space and their dominant scanning ports 
identification. Using this methodology we identi-
fy five types of anomaly hosts with their three 
behaviors and obtained some sample results in 
the form of table and graph. 
In future we will extend this work. In extension 
work we will again try to detect more number of 
anomalies with their detail behaviors. In present 
work we are giving only message to GUI when 
there is anomaly exist but in future we will also 
makes a lot of provisions to prevent or defend the 
network by removing such anomalies and this 
will be the complete work for anomaly detection 
and prevention. Then that total work will call as 
design implementation and prevention from net-
work anomalies. In the present work we are using 
IP Gray Space to detect various anomalies but in 
future we will also use time series analysis and 
wavelets patterns to detect and prevent from 
more number of anomalies. 
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